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Abstract
This paper introduces an adaptation of the Circuits of Power, a framework for studying
institutionalization as an outcome of power. In this paper, we have interpreted each of
the framework’s concepts and linked them to relevant research questions about power in
the institutionalization of information systems. The institutionalization of an information
system entails stabilizing its processes to such a degree that its associated practices
become routine. We argue that an institutionalized system is both the result and a
source of power. The original Circuits framework (Clegg 1989) is grounded in
organizational theory and social sciences and integrates different perspectives on
power. Each perspective unravels a different dimension of power that complements and
enriches the others – hence it is a profound tool for analyzing a complex phenomenon
such as power. In a longitudinal in-depth case study, we use the adapted framework as
an interpretive research instrument to make sense of power and its relation to the
institutionalization of an information system. The paper concludes by discussing the
possibilities the framework offers to practitioners and its implications for researchers.
Keywords: Power, Politics, Adoption, Institutionalization, Implementation, Diffusion
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Introduction
Questions about how information systems are related to power have been central to
research in our field for the last two decades. There are studies concerning each stage
of the information systems life cycle. For example, we know that analysts’ worldviews
influence the systems analysis and final design stages (Kling 1991; Tan, Watson, et al.
1995; Tan, Wei, Watson, Clapper et al. 1998; Alvarez 2002; Davidson 2002). This
process can be laden with particular or group interests (Hirschheim and Klein 1994;
Bloomfield and Coombs 1992; Sillince and Mouakket 1998; Griffith, Fueller et al. 1998,
Robey and Boudreau 1999; Marsahall and Brady 2001; Thanasankit 2002;
Saravanamuthu 2002; Howcroft and Wilson 2003). We also know that the
implementation process can be a source of conflict between information systems
professionals and users (Keen 1981; Markus 1983; Markus and Bjorn-Anderson 1987;
Robey and Smith 1993; Newman and Sabherwal 1996).
Furthermore, information systems, once in place, can be instruments of surveillance and
control as well as tools for instilling discipline (Zuboff 1988; Introna 1997; Pinsonneault
and Kraemer 1997). Likewise, information technology can be regarded as an instrument
for empowerment and as a vehicle for autonomy (Bjorn-Andersen et al. 1982; Ehn and
Kyng 1987; Williams and Wilson 1997; Dennis, Hilmer, et al. 1998). Researchers have
also observed the political connotations of the information systems function in
organizations (Lucas 1984; Cavaye and Christiansen 1996; Saunders and Scammel
1986). Although individually all these studies have made contributions to our
understanding of power, there has yet to emerge a theoretical model that can give an
integrated account of power throughout the entire process of information systems
design, development and implementation, that is, from conception to institutionalization.
A recent study by Jasperson et. al. (2002) examined a sample of 82 papers concerning
the relationship between power and information systems. Not surprisingly, they found
that this relationship has been studied from multiple theoretical perspectives.
Nevertheless, very few articles – 13 of the 82 – integrate different perspectives. The rest
were one-dimensional. A one-dimensional view of power, however insightful, falls short
in depicting its complexity. By contrast, as Jasperson et. al. (2002) notice in their paper,
an integrative theoretical approach, by virtue of its variety, would not only present the
different insights of its components, but would also allow researchers to identify
contradictions and paradoxes that otherwise would not be apparent. The idea that power
is a phenomenon whose understanding requires multiple theoretical perspectives is also
sustained in our field by Sillince and Mouakket (1997, 1998). Hence, the main purpose
and motivation of this paper is the integration of different conceptions of power into a
theoretical framework for the study of the institutionalization of information systems.
We adopted the notion of institutionalization from the work of the sociologists Berger and
Luckman (1967). By drawing on these authors’ work we can say that information
systems become institutionalized when they are no longer considered as novelties, but
as unnoticed and unremarkable tools that people take for granted in doing their work. An
information system is institutionalized when associated practices and procedures have
become routines that can be regarded as organizational habits. These organizational
habits become typified in such a way that each particular type of action will be executed
by specific kinds of users. We argue that the exercise of power is required to
institutionalize a system, particularly if the system is resisted, and, once in place, it
becomes a source of power.
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Thus, this paper has two research objectives. One is the adaptation of a theoretical
framework that was originally developed in the fields of sociology and organization
studies to explore the role of power in the institutionalization of information systems. The
second objective of the paper is to demonstrate the explanatory power of the framework
by virtue of an in-depth case study. The value of the framework is thus shown in two
ways. First, it guides the identification of the data required to compose a compelling
narrative about the institutionalization of the information system. Second, it has value as
an analytical tool by obtaining theoretical and practical implications about the
phenomena of power and the institutionalization of information systems.
This paper is structured according to our research goals. Hence, in the next section we
introduce the theoretical framework, its main concepts, and our interpretation of how to
apply it to study the institutionalization of information systems. Our research approach is
introduced in Section Three, while Section Four presents the results of our fieldwork, a
longitudinal in-depth case study that traces an information system from its inception to its
eventual institutionalization. Section Five concerns the analysis of the case and
highlights the different components of the framework and how they are related to the
data. Finally, in Section Six we reflect on the implications, contributions, and limitations
of our work.

The Circuits of Power Framework
The proposed framework is an adaptation of Clegg’s Circuits of Power (1989). Among
the different theories for the study of power, we selected the Circuits framework because
it integrates different views about and perspectives on power. The concepts brought
about by Clegg derive from relevant advances in the sociology of sciences (Callon 1986;
Callon 1987; Latour 1987; Law 1986) and the sociology of organizations (DiMaggio
1988; Meyer and Rowan 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The Circuits framework also
includes power concepts from political science and sociology, such as those found in the
works of Lockwood (1964), Parsons (1967), and Lukes (1974). Clegg also integrates into
his model the notion of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977). In addition to combining
different views of power, another of the appealing characteristics of the framework stems
from its conception of power as fundamentally strategic, applying Machiavelli’s insights.
Clegg is interested not only in the actions of organizational agents, but also in their
intentions, strategies, and plots.
In the Circuits framework, power is central in sustaining and providing stability to social
systems. This is a different conception of power than the one contained in structuration
theory (Giddens, 1984). Giddens (1984: 257) defines power as ”the capacity of agents to
achieve outcomes.” It is essential in Giddens’ conception that individuals are
knowledgeable and that in acting they reflect on their own situation. It would be fair to
say that Giddens’ conception of power concentrates on individuals’ actions (Layder,
1987; Barbalet, 1987). When comparing Clegg’s model of power with Giddens’
structuration theory, the most distinctive difference is that the former considers power
beyond actions. In Giddens’ proposal, the idea of a knowledgeable individual is
fundamental to understand how social life is structured. However, Giddens does not
explain how the knowledgeable individual is constituted. By incorporating Foucault’s
work into the framework, Clegg is able to link the construction of the knowledgeable
individual with power. The knowledgeable individual, then, is the result of discourses and
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disciplinary techniques. This is what Clegg’s notion of power adds to a conception based
on agency.
There are three circuits of power: episodic, social and systemic.1 Clegg argues that, for
an innovation to be adopted and then institutionalized, it has to be integrated into the
organization at three levels that correspond to the three circuits of power. These three
levels are; episodic, social integration, and systemic integration. Each circuit is defined
by a different type of power: causal in the episodic circuit, dispositional for social
integration, and facilitative for systemic integration. Clegg uses the metaphor of circuits
to emphasize the relational nature of power. In fact, nothing actually circulates or moves;
this is merely a ready-to-hand metaphor. What occurs is that rules, procedures, and
techniques of discipline shape both interpersonal relations and work tasks, thus
circumscribing the scope for action of the individuals in organizations. So strong are
these social and disciplinary forces that the electro-physical circuit metaphor renders the
idea well.
The Circuits of Power framework is not an exhaustive theory, yet it integrates several
different concepts of power to account for the process of institutionalization. In this
sense, Clegg (1989: 239) asserts that the virtue of his framework is “…to admit an
insight to each distinct conception which the others do not share. On this basis, power
can be understood analytically as moving through three distinct circuits, carried always
by the organization of agencies.”2 It is the integration of those different conceptions that
provides the theory with its explanatory power. As it will be shown in the narrative and
analysis of the case, an account of power based on only one dimension would not be as
clear as one that integrates different views.
The following subsections offer a more detailed description of each circuit and present
the aspects of information systems research that are derived from them. These have
been summarized in Table 1. The Table shows the main concepts of the framework in
columns one and two, and we introduce our interpretation and adaptation of the
framework in columns three and four. In column three, we make a link between the
concepts of the framework and previously researched power issues in the field of
information systems, allowing us to formulate research questions. Thus in our
adaptation of the framework, we interpret its concepts, link them to information systems
research issues, and frame specific research questions in order to account for the
circuits of power in information systems institutionalization.

1

Clegg uses the term system integration; however, to avoid semantic misunderstandings with the
way we use the term system, we will refer to this circuit as “systemic integration”.
2
In his book, “Frameworks of Power” (see Clegg (1989)), Clegg argues for the integrative nature
of his framework by discussing the different theoretical approaches to power from Hobbes to
Callon (1986). It meticulously examines other organizational frameworks of power. For example,
in discussing resource dependency theory Pfeffer, (1981) Clegg (1989: 190) would integrate this
concept in his framework, in the sense that A’s power over B depends on A controlling resources.
Furthermore, Clegg would extend his framework to the organizational norms and rules of practice
that predetermine their relationship.
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Episodic Circuit of Power and Causal Power
The character of this circuit can be recognized in Dahl’s (1957) definition of power: A
exercises power over B when A makes B do something B otherwise would not do. For
the purpose of this paper, we can define this relationship as the one that managers, or
other powerful organizational agents, have with systems users. This relationship would
be especially apt when managers make users operate a system that, given the
opportunity, they would not otherwise use. John Law (1991) calls the power circulating in
the episodic circuit ‘power over’ or causal power. The essence of ‘power over’ he
maintains, lies in its relational nature, which can be seen in the relationship between A
and B. The outcomes of causal power are actions; B does things he or she would not
otherwise do. Therefore, without resistance, causal power cannot be identified
(Foucault, 19823). It follows that we could not claim that power has been exercised if
users were willing to use the system. In such a situation, causal power has not been
exerted.
For the purposes of studying the institutionalization of information systems as an
outcome of power, the main research issue derived from this circuit is the identification
of the As and Bs, establishing who are the promoters and champions of a system and
who are its resistors. The next analytical step is the formulation of A’s desired outcome,
articulated in terms of B’s actions; e.g. one strives to implement the system while the
other struggles to resist it. In addition, we need to establish what are the tactics and
strategies adopted by each side during these disputes. Finally, the episodic circuit is
complete when we can identify the standing conditions of both A and B i.e. the positions
that they occupy in the organization and the resources to which they have access and
which they deploy in the course of their struggles over the system. As will be discussed
in the next section, the concept of standing conditions directly links the circuit of episodic
power with that of social integration.

The Circuit of Social Integration and Dispositional Power
While episodic power concentrates on causal power, the circuit of social integration
emphasizes dispositional power, with its main elements being the rules that govern
meaning and membership in organizations. Wrong (1995) conceptualized dispositional
power as a set of capacities and made a distinction between the notions of having and
exercising power. In this sense, a capacity is a characteristic or position that entitles or
enables someone to exercise power, but does not necessarily imply its exercise. Power
conceived in this manner is a capacity that can cause something to happen. Clegg
3

Power is present even if there is no behavior associated. Clegg (1989) points out that limiting
the analysis of power only to the concept episodic power would constrain our understanding of
this phenomenon. In making this point Clegg cites Bacharach’s and Baratz’s (1962) notion of
mobilization of bias; that illustrates how power is exercised without manifesting any behavior.
Clegg complements Dahl’s behavioral definition of power by adding the other two circuits of
power.
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illustrates the idea of dispositional power with the example of a traffic police officer on a
busy street who has the power to stop the traffic, whether he actually does it or not. The
dispositional power of the police officer is embedded in the shared norms that bind the
institutions of traffic regulations and the police in an urban society. Dispositional power
becomes causal power when the policeman decides to intervene to regulate traffic.
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Table 1. The Circuits Framework as proposed by Clegg; its relation to information systems and our interpretation
Circuit
Episodic

Type of power
Causal Power
When A makes B do
something B otherwise
would not do.

Exemplary Research in information systems and Main Ideas
(Keen 1981; Markus 1983; Markus and Bjorn-Andersen 1987; Wynne
and Otway 1982; Franz and Robey 1984; Newman and Robey, 1992;
Robey and Smith 1993; Beath 1991; Newman and Sabherwal 1996;
Sillince and Mouakket 1997; Tractinsky and Jarvenpaa 1995;Robey
and Boudreau 1999; Torvinen and Jalonen 2000)
•
•
•
•

Social
Integration

Dispositional Power
It provides the conditions
for As to exercise power. It
is rooted in rules of
meaning and membership
of the organization.

Facilitative Power
This power is fruitful in the
sense that causes the
organization to generate
outcomes. It is defined by
the techniques of
production and discipline of
the organization

•
•
•

•

•
•

•

The relevance of language and meanings as channels of power
The role of language and discourse and its relationship to
technology in the exercise of power
The relevance of status in power relations
Culture and power

(Zuboff 1988; Orlikowski 1992; Walsham 1993; Bjorn-Andersen et al.
1982; Hirschheim and Klein 1994; Williams and Wilson 1997;
Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1997; Dennis, Hilmer et al. 1998; Griffith,
Fuller et al. 1998; Sillince and Mouakket 1998; Tan, Wei et al. 1998;
Marshall and Brady 2001; Saravanamuthu 2002; Howcroft and Wilson
2003)
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•

(Boland 1993; Boland 1996; Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Kling 1991;
Bloomfield and Coombs 1992; Monteiro and Hanseth 1995; Walsham
1993; Noble and Newman 1993; Tan, Watson et al. 1995; Tan, Wei,
Wei, Watson and Walczuch 1998; Alvarez 2002; Davidson 2002;
Thanasankit 2002)

•
•
Systemic
Integration

Focus on the relations between systems professionals and users
Emphasis on alliances and commitment for the implementation of
systems
The idea of a champion getting support for a new system
Relations between managers and subordinates; the former
inducing conduct by the latter

•

Information systems as the electronic panopticon; dominance
and hegemony
Power and information systems as resources to achieve
outcomes
Information systems as instruments of oppression or
emancipation
Dominance in groups
Information systems and control
Achievement of organizational outcomes
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•
•

•
•
•
•

Our Interpretation of the Framework in Terms of
Research Issues
Who are the As and Bs? The identification of those
promoting and championing the system and those who
resist it.
What are the particular objectives of As and Bs in their
struggles around the system?
What are the strategies and tactics adopted by As and
Bs for the achievement of their objectives?
What are the standing conditions of As and Bs? These
should be given in terms of the positions hold by As and
Bs in the organizational structure.
What are the resources that As and Bs have access to
and deploy in striving to achieve their objectives?
What are the organizational rules and norms that place
As and Bs in their respective positions?
How will the institutionalized information system affect
those organizational rules and norms?
What are the meanings assigned to the information
system throughout the institutionalization process?
What are the rules and modalities of interpretation
drawn on by organizational members in making sense of
the system?
How would these modalities be affected by the
institutionalized information system?
What are the techniques employed by A to ensure and
monitor B’s compliance?
What are the work tasks that are affected by the new
information system? The work tasks before and after the
institutionalization of the system.
How can the system be set up as a resource to instill
discipline?

Silva and Backhouse/Power and Information Systems

Dispositional power is the type of power that enables one organizational member to
influence other members’ behavior even when such behavior may ostensibly be against
their interests (Lukes 1974). Accordingly, the first research issue here is to identify the
organizational rules that place A in a position to tell B what to do, and especially when B
would rather do otherwise. It concerns directly the formal statutes and rules of the
organization. By the same token, this issue entails the identification of the set of rules
that leaves B in a position to be told what to do. In this sense, the analysis of
dispositional power consists in identifying the standing conditions of A and B as
discussed in the previous subsection. In addition, by its emphasis on the rules of
membership, this circuit directs our attention to how an institutionalized system would
affect the organization, specifically the composition of groups, roles and hierarchies.
With successful deployment of power, the information system would eventually become
institutionalized and integrated into the circuits of power of the organization.
In addition to focusing on formal structures, this circuit also concerns the informal side of
the organization. The system has to be associated with discourses that legitimate its use
and existence (Weick 1995). In the process of institutionalization, different types of users
will execute the processes and tasks associated with the system. As a result, the system
may change or reinforce the way different organizational members think about their jobs.
These are the modalities of interpretation created, reconstituted, refreshed, reinforced,
and drawn on by organizational members when assigning meanings to information
systems (Walsham 1993). Thus, in terms of rules of meaning there are two levels of
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analysis. The first one consists in tracing the meanings assigned to the system, from the
time of the resistance to the stage when they have successfully been institutionalized.
And the second concerns in identifying the rules of interpretation drawn on by
organizational members throughout and after the institutionalization process.

The Circuit of Systemic Integration and Facilitative Power
This circuit considers power as facilitative (Parsons, 1967). Hence it is understood in
terms of its ability to produce and achieve collective goals. The facilitative notion of
power is positive, characterized by a non-zero sum game and a productive conception.
While dispositional power is concerned with the capacities that pre-configure the
standing conditions necessary for episodic power to occur, facilitative power comprises
the material conditions of production, including those technological means for controlling
the physical and social environment in organizations. Clegg (1989) calls these means
techniques of production and discipline.4 For example, in an organization, managers
(As) could draw on different techniques to discipline employees (Bs) whose conduct is
regarded as discordant to organizational objectives. In this situation, A’s actions are
legitimized by her standing conditions and facilitated by the techniques available to her.5
The resulting coordination in working practices is what we call systemic integration.
Organizational activity depends ultimately on the subordination of individuals to
collective goals. The techniques that ensure organizational compliance are what
Foucault (1977) termed ‘disciplinary practices’. These practices consist mainly in the
surveillance of organizational members through the collection, recording and comparison
of data. These disciplinary practices can be recognized in different forms of
organizational control over employees such as: “supervision, routinization, formalization,
mechanization and legislation, which seek to effect increasing control of employees’
behavior, dispositions and embodiment, precisely because they are organizational
members” (Clegg 1989: 191). In addition to techniques, organizations also adopt policies
of rewards and sanctions for disciplining their members.
As hinted above, this circuit addresses two main research questions: (1) what are the
techniques deployed by A to ensure and monitor B’s compliance, and (2) what are the
work tasks that are affected by the new information system? As discussed previously,
the techniques of discipline are critical if the system is to be institutionalized. Once the
institutionalization stage has been achieved, the system itself is transformed into an
instrument for instilling discipline. Another research issue, therefore, is to identify how
the system can be set up as a resource to instill discipline. Furthermore, the research
task will be to distinguish the working practices related to the information system before
and after its institutionalization. This is a power issue since an institutionalized system
will affect the actions of organizational members as a result of the new work tasks
embedded in the system.
All together, these three different perspectives make the Circuits framework a strong

4

In fact, Clegg (1989: 232) refers to facilitative power also as disciplinary, in the Foucaultian
sense (Foucault 1977).
5
These techniques are not all the resources available to managers or other powerful agents.
They are disciplinary practices, such as the surveillance of organizational members through the
collection, register and comparison of performance data.
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analytical tool. Figures 1 and 2 depict how the three are combined. The circuit of
episodic power determines the roles of As and Bs, which are defined by the rules of
meaning and membership: the key components of the circuit of social integration.
Likewise, the tactics adopted by As and Bs are related to techniques of production and
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Figure 2. The Levels of Integration Required for Institutionalization
discipline, which are the very fundamentals of the systemic circuit. This relationship is
depicted in Figure 1. The arrows from social and systemic integration denote how the
dispositional and facilitative power of A is the result of those two organizational circuits
of power. Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates how institutionalization is
interconnected with the other two circuits, social and systemic integration. It depicts how
the system, once institutionalized, becomes embedded in the circuits of power of the
organization and turns into a source of power.
In summary, we have seen in this section how we interpret each of the circuits of power
and how they are linked to the institutionalization of information systems. In so doing, we
have discussed how the power concepts suggested by the framework are related to the
institutionalization of information systems. This paper argues that the institutionalization
of an information system requires the integration of these three circuits of power and that
institutionalization entails the system itself becoming a source of power. Hence our
fieldwork has as its main purpose to demonstrate how this occurs in a particular
organization. We collect data and establish our research questions regarding each
circuit so we can develop a narrative of the case. The application of the framework will
allow us to elicit theoretical propositions about power and the institutionalization of
information systems.
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Research approach
The site
This case study concerns the Center for the Study of Food and Nutrition Sciences of
Central America (CFNCA)6, which has its headquarters in Guatemala City. One of the
reasons we selected CFNCA as our research site was because of the compelling power
issues in the adoption and institutionalization of its new administrative information
system. Members of the organization identified conflicts and struggles throughout the
design and implementation of the system, which is currently playing a fundamental role
in managing the Center. Access was another factor in selecting this site. It is not easy to
obtain access to organizations to do research, especially if the goal of the research is to
discover power relations. Hence Buchanan et. al. (1988: 55) recommend a pragmatic,
almost opportunistic, approach in the search of organizations for conducting fieldwork.
But we were able to approach personnel and secure access to related documentation
because one of the authors had worked there in the mid 1980s. His previous experience
with the organization provides us with insights into its politics. Besides, this familiarity
was fundamental not only when selecting our interviewees, but also in gaining their
confidence.
The focus of this fieldwork is CFNCA’s computerized administrative information system.
Implemented in the early 1990s mainly as an initiative to control the finances of the
Center, the system was institutionalized by 1996.
Given CFNCA’s semi-autonomous nature and matrix structure, its administration
presents interesting power aspects (see Figure 3). CFNCA is part of the Americas’
Health System (AHS)7, which has its central offices in Washington D.C. and while AHS
is responsible for the administration of CFNCA, the Center enjoys some degree of
autonomy regarding the content, extent and human resources of its research projects,
as spelled out by its founders, the Central American countries ministers of health, in
1948. Under AHS’s administration, CFNCA's mission has been to conduct research on
health and nutrition. AHS appoints two authorities to CFNCA: the research director and
the administrator. The former is in charge of research activities while the latter manages
the administrative functions.

Data Collection
We collected data in two stages. For the first stage, we spent six weeks at the CFNCA
headquarters, from the second week of December 1995 to the third week of January
1996. CFNCA’s authorities gave us an office where we were based every day from 8:00
AM to 7:00 PM. During these hours, we conducted the interviews, typed the transcripts,
attended meetings and also collected and reproduced relevant documents. The second
stage spanned the autumn of 1996 to the end of January 1999. During that period of
time, we visited CFNCA four times; each visit lasted about a week. We maintained close
contacts with our informants via e-mail and telephone throughout the second stage of
our fieldwork.
We developed interview guides following the concepts of the theoretical framework and
6

The name of the organizations has been changed.
See footnote 7

7

304

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 6, pp. 294-336/November 2003

Silva and Backhouse/Power and Information Systems

AHS
Research
Director

Library

Research
Departments

Finance
Accounting
Administrator
Human
Resources
Information
Systems

Figure 3. CFNCA's Organizational Chart
conducted a total of 35 semi-structured interviews with an average duration of two hours
(see Table 1 and the Appendix). The interviewees were allowed to express their views
on aspects they considered of importance. Rather than taping the interviews, we took
notes and, immediately after each interview, typed the transcripts. Although we
acknowledge that taping would have provided more accuracy in terms of the
expressions and use of language, the interviewees would have not felt comfortable
talking about power issues in the organization knowing that they would be taped. Among
the individuals interviewed were the director, administrator, and IT staff, as well as
people who had recently been made redundant. Interviewing redundant staff was one of
the essential elements for obtaining information about the politics of the organization.
We noticed that those recently released from the organization talked very freely about
power, while those still employed showed more restraint. We collected and analyzed 42
documents, including some written by external consultants. These consisted mainly of
recommendations about the way the administrative information system should have
been coordinated and the consultants’ evaluations of the overall status of the system.
We were allowed to photocopy some of the documents; otherwise we took notes. We
classified each document according to author, date and type of document (i.e. memo,
report, etc.). These documents played a crucial role in providing us with multiple
interpretations regarding the situation of the system (Klein and Myers 1999).8
8

We constructed a Case Data Base. Documents were stored using the Endnotes package and
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Data Analysis
We adopted an interpretive approach for the analysis of the data (Klein and Myers 1999;
Walsham 1993), reading all the transcripts, documents and observation notes in order to
identify issues and themes related to the institutionalization of the information system. In
our analysis and interpretation we emphasized power issues, informed by the concepts
of the theoretical framework. Then we proceeded to write a draft report of our findings –
a preliminary version of the case study – which we shared with three of our informants.
We incorporated their feedback into our case study, which helped us to complete the
hermeneutic circle (Klein and Myers 1999). After the second round of readings, we were
able to write a narrative that described how the institutionalization of the system
occurred. To clarify our analysis, we built a matrix containing the events that led to the
institutionalization of the system. These events were arranged in chronological order and
then classified according to the conceptual framework.
The completion of the hermeneutic circle was also facilitated by one of the authors who
had worked in this organization four years prior to the fieldwork, As mentioned above,
this was fundamental for the analysis of our data since it provided us with valuable
insights regarding the context of the system and the organization. In addition, the
experience of working there helped us to identify the main data sources. Because of our
knowledge of the organization, it was not difficult to identify who ought to be interviewed
and which documents were relevant, and more importantly, where they were located and
who owned them. Furthermore, we developed an almost immediate rapport with the
interviewees because they perceived us as their friends. As a result of the former links,
senior management, including the director, were favorably disposed toward collaborating
with the research.
Despite all the positive dimensions that stem from the familiarity with the country, culture
and organization, there are still some limitations. Having worked at CFNCA might have
created in us a predisposition or bias toward the political structure of the organization.
Equally, it is possible that because some of the members of the organization were
former colleagues, we might have held unconscious prejudices toward them. By the
same token, it is possible that the interviewees might have thought: “Here comes the
computer chap, playing the researcher role now.” We are aware of these limitations;
however, we believe that the advantages of possessing knowledge of the prevailing
culture outweigh the disadvantages. These circumstances were key for completing the
hermeneutic circle in our interpretations. It is also clear that regardless of the type of
relation between the researcher and the object of study, prejudices from both sides are
unavoidable. Hence researchers engaged in this type of research should provide the
readers with some assurance regarding the validity of their investigations. Klein and
Myers (1999) offer a set of criteria that can be applied to gauge the validity of qualitative
research in which interpretations are fundamental. They propose a set of six principles
with which we can examine the validity of interpretive research. Table 2 shows how our
research stands against such criteria.

the interviews were stored, organized and classified using a word processor, Microsoft Word
(version) 6.0.
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Table 2. Validation Criteria
Klein and Myers Criteria
1. Contextualization
To make sense, the interpretations require the
historical and social context.
2. Interaction between the researchers and the
subjects
The subjects of the interviews are offering their
interpretations of the phenomenon under study.
The social interaction between researcher and
interviewees influence the study.
3. Abstraction and generalization
The generalization of particulars to abstract
categories; generalization to social theories.

Our Research
One of the authors used to work in the organization
One of the researchers is a compatriot of the interviewees
The historical and social context are presented in the results
section
Selection of documentary sources to complement transcripts of the
interviews
Recognition that the researcher drew upon his historical
background in the selection of material and identification of sources
The theoretical concepts are related to the field work through the
interview guides and also are reflected in the discussion and
implications
The fieldwork illustrates the concepts of the adapted circuits
framework
The application of the adapted framework to the case study
facilitated the generation of theoretical propositions about power
and institutionalization of information systems.

4. Dialogical reasoning
The confrontation of the original assumptions
and preconceptions.

As the researcher used to work in the organization, the
acknowledgement that the subjects could have had prejudices
against the researcher and vice-versa. As this was acknowledged
documents and observations were also conducted.
The sharing of the preliminary case reports with informants.
Informants provided their comments regarding whether our
interpretations were biased or not. Their comments were
incorporated into the preliminary versions of the case.
The limitations of the theory and research approach are presented
in the last section.

5. Multiple interpretations
The relationship among context, power, social
actions and intentions

The adapted Circuits of Power framework makes sense of why
different actors may have different interpretations of the system. It
explains multiple interpretations in terms of different identities,
group membership and interests.
The research involved different types of interviewees whose
statements were complemented with data from other sources such
as documents.

6. Suspicion
The unravelling of distortions created by the
political, social and historical contexts of the
subjects

We focused on different types of subjects
The research focuses on how different actors had different
interpretations and how these reflected their particular interests

Case Narrative
Stage 1: Genesis of the system
The idea of the administrative information system began in 1990, triggered by a
particular event. Because of the composite nature of the administration of CFNCA,
clearance of accounts was not always a straightforward task. In 1989, an audit team
from the U.S. government discovered anomalies in CFNCA operations that were
financed by American funds, and vetoed payment for hundreds of thousands of dollars
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that had been contractually agreed upon. The reason given by the auditors was that
certain operations had infringed upon specific regulations, such as the purchase of
computers from outside the U.S. and official travel using non-U.S. airlines. The deficit
created by the refusal to clear those accounts was covered by AHS, the guarantor of the
American government in research project contracts. To resolve the crisis, AHS
appointed a new administrator for CFNCA. When the newly appointed administrator
began his job, he had one main goal in mind: to eliminate the deficit by applying strict
controls supported by information technology. The deficit was substantial and the cause
was deemed to be CFNCA’s unorthodox, almost maverick administrative practices. The
administrative personnel told us, for instance, that quite often project managers would
circumvent the formal administrative controls just to obtain faster authorization for their
transaction requests. The administrator thought that a new information system would
allow its department to incorporate tighter controls.
To develop the new administrative information system, the administrator needed the
support of AHS. AHS was interested in the administrator’s project, but the conditions for
Washington’s participation had yet to be defined. From the outset, AHS made it clear
that they were prepared to pay for some equipment (the servers and the backbone of the
network) and the salaries of those involved in the design and development of the
system. The rest of the expenses, including PC clients, printers and basic office
automation software, had to be covered with funds originating from research project
budgets. The administrator offered his bosses in North America a reduction of the deficit
by linking both budget and expenses. He pledged to incorporate into the system the
AHS administrative rules, particularly those regarding the hiring of personnel and the
acquisition of goods and services. The new administrative information system would
force the researchers of the center to follow Washington’s regulations, and AHS
authorities welcomed this.
Besides his argument in favor of more strict controls, the administrator had another
factor to support the approval of his project: he had a very good relationship with senior
management in Washington. One former member of the administrative unit described it:
The administrator had a wonderful relationship with the bosses in Washington. I think
that the main reason he was appointed to solve the mess in CFNCA was the result of
being a very good friend of the senior administrator in Washington. They were
schoolmates a long time ago in their home country in South America.
This boosted the administrator’s credibility and was key for his getting the support to
develop the system. Thus, for AHS the new system was a way to save money and to
strengthen its control over CFNCA’s operations. By early 1991, the administrator had
AHS authorization to go ahead with the system, and its commitment to pay for a large
proportion of the system’s expenses.
However, the administrator also required the cooperation of the researchers, not only as
prospective users but also as providers of the funds for purchasing the workstations.
This was not an easy task. By 1990, research project managers had started to question
the efficiency of the administration by comparing the contributions of their projects with
the quality of the services received. When the administrator proposed the new
information system, his unit was struggling to cope with the demands made by project
managers. The limited memory of the old system, only 2MB of RAM, and its inability to
deal with more than 24 users simultaneously, made the administration slow and
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inaccurate in responding to project managers’ requests for information and services.
This hindered the execution of research projects and the possibility of achieving results
within the stipulated timelines. A research project manager described this situation:
The former administrative information system was a real pain in the neck. We could not
have information regarding the balance of our projects. We never knew how much
money was available. Besides, the system was running all the procurement transactions,
so whenever we needed stuff for our projects the administration department would take
a long time before acquiring and delivering the goods. They would always put the blame
on the lack of capacity of the computerized information system.
The administrator won the support of the project managers after persuading them that
the new system would improve administration services, and most importantly by
pledging not to raise the cost of their services. In this way, the administrator was able to
obtain the support of the authorities as well as the cooperation of the researchers as
sponsors and prospective users of the system.

Stage 2: Implementation, Disruptions and Resistance
The design of the system followed completely the guidelines of AHS and the funding
agencies without consulting the users. One of the researchers complained about it:
In fact, I do not recall being called to talk to the designers or
system analysts. I remember we were offered the system and we
were asked to pay for the workstations with money from our
projects. Yet, during the design phase, we were not consulted by
the administration.
The designers made many consultations; but not with the end users. Instead, they
consulted documents, managers in the AHS headquarters and donor agencies. One of
the designers expressed his views about how they proceeded:
The head of the team was very clear in telling us that the most
important feature of the system had to be the compliance with the
rules and procedures of AHS and the major funding agencies. We
had to spend a long time deciphering the meanings of the
regulations to be able to implement those rules in the system. In
many occasions when in doubt we phoned people from AHS and
from the donor agencies.
The development of the system took a year, and its implementation, until the production
stage in late 1992 (see Figure 4), took a further six months.
The new system had to achieve three objectives: (1) budget control, (2) financial
transactions compliance with AHS and funding agencies regulations, and (3)
enhancement of the administrative services provided to the researchers. Consequently,
the system was developed with three main modules: budget control, accounting, and the
automation of transactions. The main function of the first module was to ensure that
each expense incurred by research projects corresponded to an entry in their annual
budget plan. The second module handled operations such as payroll, check processing,
balance statements, and the opening and closing of accounts. This module ensured that
all these operations would comply with the regulations of both AHS and the funding
agencies. The third module dealt with the automation of transactions such as the
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acquisition of goods and services for the projects. The transactions supported by this
module also included local and international trips, hiring and appointing personnel,
transportation, printing, photocopying and purchase of equipment and office supplies. By
virtue of the new system, researchers were no longer able to commit funds by informally
contacting the personnel in the administration office. After the implementation of the
system, any request for committing funds needed a hand-written authorization signed by
three actors: the principal investigator, the administrator and the director of CFNCA. The
idea behind the signatures was to make the researchers legally accountable for the
transactions. The system helped CFNCA to achieve its first two objectives. Yet despite
this success, the new strict controls brought in by the system did not speed up the
delivery of administrative services.
The system design favored the control from the administration over the operation of the
research projects control the finances of the Center, the system was institutionalized by
1996. It stressed strict financial controls that included manual controls for each
transaction, and these were more important than the speeding up of the processes.
Consequently, in order to buy a particular good, a research project manager, once
logged onto the system, had to:
1. Access the system and input the request. The user must specify the details of the
entry in the budget that will cover the expenses.
2. Print the requests. These requests must be signed by both the research project
manager and the manager of the unit or department.
3. Once the document is signed and authorized, the user informs the system that
the document containing the request has been fully authorized. The request then
reaches an administrative officer (the control officer) who establishes whether the
document is appropriately signed and whether the entry in the budget is valid. If
everything is in order, then the purchase request will be processed.
4. Before the purchase is carried out, both the administrator and the director must
sanction it by signing a document. The control officer will contact the supplier of
the goods only after ensuring that the request and documents are in order; i.e.
with all the required signatures and covered by a valid budget entry.
Thus, the purchasing of simple office supplies may require up to six signatures and
could take three weeks for delivery. Moreover, the whole process depends almost totally
on the discretion of the control officer. (However, as every transaction will follow AHS
regulations, the administration ensures the clearance of accounts. This had created
problems for research project managers who had experienced delays in the execution of
their projects). One of them described his perception of the administrative information
system and the control units:
The administrative information system gets stuck in the control
units. Those are real bottlenecks. For example, when the
document or order reaches one of those units, their personnel will
usually say that the previous one did not do its job properly.
Nevertheless, by the time they have made up their differences
time has passed and we got delays.
One of our interviewees complained with some humor about the paradox that
transactions made on a computerized information system had to be accompanied by
signed pieces of paper:
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I call the administrative system Jurassic Park because it is a
system that creates and follows transactions only through paper.
Those in the control units do not move anything without a written
signature. The system is a step backwards.
Another complained about the number of signatures and waiting time for the
authorization of requests: “… the problem with the administrative information system is
the control units. For example, a purchase order can take up to 20 signatures. The last
time I wanted to buy a stamp, it took me almost a week!”
By early 1993, the first version of the system was a source of tension between
researchers and the administration. It did not achieve its third objective: the
enhancement of the administrative services. In terms of requirements, the system was
designed according to AHS’ needs; however, it was disrupting the work of the
researchers. Despite paying for and consenting to the new information system, research
project managers complained about how the administrative tasks were taking away time
could have been better spent on tasks directly related to the scientific nature of their
projects. In addition, the researchers regarded use of the system as clerical in nature
and not proper for their role as investigators. One of the support staff in the
administration expressed it in the following manner:
Researchers are not going to sit down and use the system. That
simply is not going to happen. They say that it is because they are
busy and do not have time. Yet, for me they do not do it because
they regard the operation of these systems as having a clerical
nature. They would see the use of the system as something not in
agreement with their positions.
Frustrated with the operation of the system, with its slowness and its failure to provide
information for decision-making, the researchers openly complained during staff
meetings, but to no avail. According to one researcher, the administration did nothing
except take notes: “We constantly complained about the performance of the system and
about the fact that we were not getting the promised better information and services. The
administrator, though, seemed not to care…” Given the indifference of the
administration, the researchers decided to express their discontent directly to AHS at its
headquarters, and did so during a visit that two of the senior researchers made to
Washington D.C. in the spring of 1993.
In addition to their complaints about the systems, the two hinted that researchers in
CFNCA were very unhappy with the administrator. According to one interviewee, people
in AHS paid attention and promised that they would take to the administrator. However,
the researchers’ concerns were never answered because though AHS called the
administration to Washington, he simply explained that the complaints were a natural
response to the newly introduced controls. One researcher recalled the events after the
return of the administrator: “AHS, as expected, fully supported the administrator and did
not do anything to resolve the problems with the system.”
After his return from Washington D.C., the administrator continued with his
implementation plan, and eliminated all parallel systems. Now, the only way the
researchers could access their funds was through the new information system. As
frustration grew, the researchers called an emergency meeting at the end of 1993. The
meeting was long and heated, and the researchers told the administration that the
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system was unable to deliver results on time and if the problems with the system were
not going to be solved, they would go again to AHS. As a consequence, the
administration created administrative assistant positions, which would operate the
system and be funded with overhead costs. While not totally happy with that financial
agreement, the researchers realized it was the only way they could make the system
work in a way that would get them their funds without disturbing their jobs. In the
meantime, before the formal hiring, staff from the administration would be deployed to
the researchers’ offices to operate the system.
By the end of 1994, there were a total of seven administrative assistants, one for each
research department, fully funded out of research projects. Within a few months of
beginning their work, they were the only ones who knew how to operate the system. One
administrative assistant described her relation with the researchers and administrators:
The researchers do not use the system at all. They are not
interested in the system, either in its operation or in its features.
Any time they need something they would ask us to do it. We will
operate the system and get the authorization from all the different
actors.
The researchers were pleased with the presence of the administrative assistants. One
research project manager expressed it this way:
My research projects would not operate without my administrative
assistant. She does all the paperwork and looks after our financial
transactions. Without her, I would have to do all the administrative
chores and that would mean that I would have to work long hours
dealing with administrative stuff. I would definitely hate that.
By 1996, the system was playing a fundamental role in keeping CFNCA finances
healthy. The administrator and AHS were satisfied and often boasted that, without their
intervention, CFNCA would have become bankrupt. One senior member of the
administration described the impact of the system:
The administrative information system has been a complete
success. Since its implementation we have not had any problems
with our funding agencies and all the projects operate within the
budgets. Each project is executed according to our norms and
those from the donor. In fact we have received very positive
feedback from AHS, they would like a system like this in their
other research centers.

Stage 3: The System Becomes Institutionalized
In early 1997, after the hiring and training of the administrative assistants, the system
was in full operation. CFNCA’s employees had adapted to the system and no longer
joked or complained about it, and for new researchers the system was transparent. We
asked one of them to talk about the administrative information system: “To be honest
with you, I do not know that much about the system. It is Clara [her administrative
assistant] who knows more about it.”
The system has experienced some technical problems, but these have been solved
routinely without bringing its existence into question: the system has been fixed in the
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circuits of power of the organization. On our last visit to the site in 1999, although the
system had been transferred to the Windows NT operating platform, the design and
procedures still remained the same and had become objectified in the procedures and
manuals of CFNCA. These documents refer to the system as a given, as the way things
are done. It has also become a fundamental part of the training of new clerical
employees. All new clerical staff receive a copy of the system user’s manual and take a
course during orientation on how to use the system. We noticed that there are
occasional instruction sessions in which employees are taught how to deal with new
upgrades or modifications. The administrative information system has become
embedded in the organizational structure of CFNCA and has become an unquestionable
part of the organizational life; it has been institutionalized.

Analysis
Our first research objective was to adapt a framework to study power in the
institutionalization of information systems. We present a summary of the adapted
framework, in terms of its concepts and its relation to data in Table 1 and the logical
relationships among the circuits in Figures 1 and 2. We applied these analytical tools to
gather data and to compose the case study as presented in the previous section. The
second objective was to demonstrate the explanatory power of the framework in an indepth case study. In this sense, Table 3 presents an outline of how the concepts of the
framework are linked to the case. Table 3 is based on Table 1, the first three columns –
the circuits of power, their type of power, our interpretation of the concepts, and the
associated research questions – are the same; the fourth column corresponds to the
data we obtained from the case. Table 3 demonstrates how we interpreted the original
framework and linked it to information systems institutionalization. Although illustrative,
this table presents a rather one-dimensional view of the circuits since it does not show
how they evolved through time. The remainder of this section presents a detailed
analysis of each circuit and how it evolved through time.
We will carry out the analysis of the case by examining how each circuit of power
became fixed and stable; that is how the information system its practices, associated
meanings, regulations and techniques of production were integrated into the
organization. Given that each circuit represents a different perspective of power, we will
analyze each separately. Table 4 presents the state of each circuit of power throughout
the three stages toward the institutionalization of the system: genesis, implementation
and final institutionalization. After the analysis of each circuit, we will argue that a richer
picture of power would require the combined view of the three circuits.

Episodic power
Figure 4 shows the chronology of how integration was achieved (Figure 4 is based on
the data of Table 5). Integration has been categorized into either low or high, and the
level of integration of each circuit is affected by the actions of the power players (i.e. the
As and Bs), those involved in the episodic circuit of power. Episodic power will be
integrated into the organizational practices when there is no substantive conflict and
resistance; that occurs by 1995 after the hiring of the administrative assistants. The
integration of the episodic circuit means that A does not have to exercise power over B
because B’s conduct regarding the system was been converted into an organizational
habit. Once the system was institutionalized, the administrator did not need to draw on
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his resources or any disciplinary technique to ensure the compliance of the researchers,
as the system had become an organizational routine.
In analyzing the power relations concerned in this circuit, it is necessary to distinguish
the As from the Bs, their respective standing conditions, as well as the course of action
that A wants B to follow. In this case, the As are the administration of CFNCA
represented by the administrator, while the Bs are the researchers. The course of action
the administrator wants the researchers to follow is to comply with AHS regulations,
implemented via the new information system. This is an issue of power since the
researchers would not have changed their maverick style of management without the
administrator exercising causal power through the new information system. Moreover, it
is an issue of power given the resistance posed by the researchers.
The standing conditions of the administrator were given by official authority delegated by
AHS and by the close relationship he had with his bosses in Washington. The authority
of the administrator was legitimate, as it was rooted in the statutes of CFNCA, which
clearly stipulate that the Center has to be administrated by AHS. Besides, the
administrator was also on good terms with senior management in Washington, a
compatriot and friend of the central administrator. Hence the CFNCA administrator drew
upon his authority and credibility to obtain the necessary resources to finance the
system, to attain the support from the headquarters and, much more importantly, to
legitimize his actions. As described by Beath (1991) in her research about top
management support, the administrator was a champion who gathered support for his
project by aligning the objectives of the system with those held by the authorities of the
organization.
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Table 3. The Circuits of Power and the Administrative Information System
Circuit
Episodic

Type of power
Causal Power
When A makes B do
something B otherwise
would not do.

•
•
•
•
•

Social
Integration

Dispositional Power
It provides the conditions
for As to exercise power.
It is rooted in rules of
meaning and
membership of the
organization.

•
•
•
•
•

Systemic
Integration

Facilitative Power
This power is fruitful in
the sense that it induces
the organization to
generate outcomes. It is
defined by the techniques
of production and
discipline of the
organization

•
•
•

Our Interpretation of the Framework in Terms of
Research Issues
Who are the As and Bs? The identification of those
promoting and championing the system and those who
resist it.
What are the particular objectives of As and Bs in their
struggles relating to the system?
What are the strategies and tactics adopted by As and
Bs for the achievement of their objectives?
What are the standing conditions of As and Bs? These
should be given in terms of the positions hold by As
and Bs in the organizational structure
What are the resources that As and Bs have access to
and employ in striving to achieve their objectives?
What are the organizational rules and norms that place
As and Bs in their respective positions?
How will the institutionalized information system affect
those organizational rules and norms?
What are the meanings assigned to the information
system throughout the institutionalization process?
What are the rules and modalities of interpretation
drawn upon by organizational members in making
sense of the system?
How would these modalities be affected by the
institutionalized information system?
What are the techniques deployed by A to ensure and
monitor B’s compliance?
What are the work tasks that are affected by the new
information system? The work tasks before and after
the institutionalization of the system.
How can the system be set up as a resource to instill
discipline?

The Circuits of Power in CFNCA
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•

The As are the administrator and the authorities in Washington, the Bs the
researchers
The As want to control and discipline the finances of research projects
The Bs want to execute the funds of their projects without delay
The As have drawn upon the administrative information system to discipline the
Bs. The Bs have tried to outflank the As, specifically the administrator, by
approaching his bosses in Washington, D.C.
The As standing conditions are given by the rules and organizational structure
of CFNCA as well as the contractual relations between donors and AHS. The
Bs standing conditions stem from their obtaining the funding for projects and
their reputation that allows them to be funded
The As have the funds provided by AHS to develop the system. In this sense,
the Bs do not have any formal resources to oppose the As
The statutes and organizational structure of CFNCA
The institutionalized information system will reinforce the current structures of
CFNCA. That is the As controlling the administration and finances of CFNCA.
For the As the system was associated with instilling discipline and bringing
back financial health to CFNCA. For the Bs initially the system was regarded as
disruptive
The As interpreted the system in terms of control. The Bs interpreted the
system in terms of efficiency
The modalities of interpretation remained the same, if not reinforced after the
institutionalization of the system. This is because the system did not modify any
of the standing conditions of both the As and the Bs
The As defined the administrative information system as an obligatory passage
point for the Bs; without using the system, the Bs could not execute their
projects. Likewise, the system itself had inscribed the regulations that the As
wanted the Bs to follow. Thus by virtue of the system the As were ensuring the
compliance of the Bs with the formers’ objectives.
The work tasks affected by the information system were the administrative,
financial, accounting and procurement practices. Before the institutionalization
of the system those practices were executed almost at the discretion of the
researchers. After the institutionalization of the system those practices were
conducted according to the As’ regulations. Indirectly, the system had a
negative effect on research tasks made the researchers to dedicate time to use
the system. This was solved by the hiring of the administrative assistants.
The system was purposefully deployed to instill discipline in the Bs’
administrative, financial, accounting and procurement practices.
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Table 4. The Circuits of Power and the Institutionalization of the System
Stage

Episodic Circuit

Social Integration

Systemic Integration

Stage 1
Genesis of the
System

A makes B use the
System.
The Administrator makes
the researchers change
their managerial practices.
Without the intervention of
the administrator the
researchers would have
not changed their
practices by using the
system.

A’s dispositional power is given by
the rules of meaning and
membership.
The administrator was able to
develop and implement the
system because he was in a
position of authority and had a
good relation with AHS. Besides
the system was deemed to help
AHS to control CFNCA.

A’s facilitative power is given by
techniques of discipline and
production.
The success of the
administrator’s project was
facilitated by the way CFNCA
operates its projects; that is all
the project funds are fully
controlled by AHS through the
administration. Researchers
could not access the funds
without the control of the
administration.

Stage 2
Implementation

The administrator cannot
make the researchers to
use the new system.
CFNCA creates the
position of the
administrative assistants.
These become the agents
of the researchers and
eventually become users
of the system in the end.

Social integration is disrupted as
the researchers regarded the use
of the system as a waste of time
and as having a clerical nature.
Social integration is achieved by
the administrative assistants role.
It was legitimate for them to attend
training sessions and to operate
the system.

Systemic integration is
disrupted because the system’s
procedures were in direct
contradiction with the working
practices of the research
project managers.

Episodic power ceased
(no As were making Bs to
do something Bs would
not otherwise do).

The information system as
institutionalized reinforces the
rules of meaning and membership
of the organization.
Administrative tasks are
performed by clerical employees.
It is a source of dispositional
power as it empowers the
administration and the
administrative assistants to deal
with the details of the execution of
the projects.
It boosts the dispositional power of
AHS and the administration since
the system legitimates their
intervention in the Centre

Stage 3
The system is
institutionalized

Now there are only
routines that people in the
organization execute as
part of their organizational
life
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Systemic integration was
achieved when the
administrative assistants
arrived. In this way the working
practices of the researchers
were not disrupted and the
original processes embedded
in the system remained intact.
The institutionalized
information system has
become a fundamental
technique of production in the
organization. Without it,
projects could not be executed.
It has also become a technique
of discipline since it is the
means by which AHS and the
administration control the
finances of the projects.
It is a source of facilitative
power because the system
allows the organization to
operate, and AHS to control it,
without interfering with the work
of the researchers.
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Integration

High

Episodic Power

Low
1990
The administrator
proposes a new
information system

1991
The administrator
obtains the resources
and authorization to
go ahead with the
system.

1992
The system is
developed
and
implemented

1993
Researchers
resist the system
and the assistants
positions are
created

Social Integration

1994
Administrative
assistants are
hired

1995
The system is
institutionalized
and integrated in
the organization;
it becomes a
source and a
product of
power.

Systemic Integration

Figure 4. Chronology of the Integration of the Circuits

The standing conditions of the researchers stemmed from their core activity of research.
Their initiatives and reputations had attracted the financial resources that had funded
CFNCA operations throughout its existence, and this was their main source of power.
However, they lacked the formal authority of the administration to withhold funds, and
consequently did not have any right to ignore controls within the Center. The
researchers could not access their funds without passing through the administration
division. Moreover, unlike the administrator, they did not have any formal lines of
communication with Washington. Figure 3 shows the lines of command according to the
organizational chart. Furthermore, the researchers were not as well organized as the
administration. They usually worked independently and concentrated mostly on their
individual projects. The administrator and his division, on the other hand, were
cohesively organized in a tight hierarchy. Thus, the cohesiveness of the administration
division, plus the formal authority, as well as his close relations with AHS gave the
administrator stronger standing conditions than those of the researchers. Eventually, the
causal power exerted by the administrator over the researchers was effective in curbing
the researchers’ initial resistance. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the
institutionalization of the system cannot be understood simply in terms of the relations
between As and Bs, it requires the complement of the other two circuits.
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Table 5. The Circuits of Power and the evolution of administrative information system
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995-1996

Episodic

New
administrator
proposes a new
information
system.

The
administrator
obtains the
resources
and authority
to develop
the system.

The system is
developed and
implemented.

The
researchers
resist the
system. They
express their
frustration to
the
administrator
and complain
directly to
AHS.
The position
of
administrative
assistants is
created.

Administrative
assistants are
hired.

The system is
institutionalized,
it is integrated in
the circuits of
power of the
organization and
it is the product
of power and a
source of power.

Social

To AHS the
system is
presented as a
tool for control
and for the
researchers as
a tool for
efficiency and
source of
information.

For AHS the
system will be
a tool to
reduce losses
as the result
of tighter
controls.
The
researchers
look forward
to a more
robust
system.

The
researchers
were not
consulted
either for the
design or for
the
development.
AHS was
consulted
throughout the
whole process.

AHS fully
supports the
administrator.
The
researchers
regard the
system as
non-sense, a
joke and as a
threat to their
identity, since
it is clerical in
nature.

The system is
no longer
regarded as a
nuisance.
Researchers
and AHS are
satisfied with
the system.

The system
defines new
roles in the
organization.

Systemic

The current
system fails to
cope with all the
demands given
its weaknesses.

The system is
designed and
developed
completely
following the
regulations of
AHS. It
disturbs the
tasks of the
researchers

The
administrator
eliminates
parallel
systems. The
only way to
access funds
is through the
information
system.

The system is
in full
operation.
The losses
are cut and
the
researchers
can access to
their funds
without taking
time out of
their tasks.

The system is
embedded in the
tasks of the
organization and
it is a
fundamental
instrument for
AHS to control
CFNCA.

Circuits of
Power

Social Integration
The main task in this part of the analysis is to identify the rules of meaning and
membership that are related to the information system (see Table 3). For the
administrator, the rules for interpreting the system were based on control, while for the
researchers they were seen in terms of efficiency. Regarding the rules of membership,
the researchers associated the operation of the system with clerks, whereas the
administration believed the system should be used by the researchers. Social integration
could be achieved as long as the system did not contradict those rules. But the first
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version of the system did result in contradictory meanings among organizational
members, as it was designed to reflect the requirements of the administration instead of
the users. Hence, the researchers’ initial rejection. Conversely, the system was a
complete success for the administration, as it was the instrument for enforcing the
stricter controls that eventually reduced CFNCA’s deficit. Moreover, it was a feather in
the cap of the administrator who was regarded in Washington as the one able to restore
order in CFNCA.
In terms of meanings, then, for the administration the system was an instrument to
improve organizational performance, while for the researchers it was a nuisance that
slowed down the running of their projects. This tension, originating in contradictory
interpretations of the same system, was resolved by hiring administrative assistants.
This was fundamental for the social integration of the system, as it impacted the original
meaning assigned to the system. It changed the researchers’ early interpretation of the
system from being an obstacle, an imposition from AHS and a joke, to becoming an
almost invisible tool crucial for the operation of the Center.
As pointed out in the theory section, to achieve social integration an information system
would also have to be aligned with the rules of membership of the organization. Since
the researchers interpreted the operation of the system as clerical, they were not keen
on being associated with it. This objection dissipated when they delegated the use of the
system to the administrative assistants. The researchers’ interpretation of the system did
not change, but as long as it was operated by the assistants they did not complain. The
researchers’ rejection of the system on the grounds that it contradicted the nature and
tasks associated with their particular profession coincides with what Bloomfield and
Coombs (1992) found in the British National Health Service (NHS). They found that
physicians resisted the use of an information system that required them to input data, as
this task was thought to be associated with nurses’ duties. As did the researchers of
CFNCA, doctors regarded the use of the information system as an affront to their
professional identity. Thus, social integration would not have been achieved without
delegating the operation of the system to the administrative assistants. It meant that the
professional identity of the researchers remained unthreatened.

Systemic Integration
The first version of the system did not reach systemic integration either. Initially, the
system contradicted the current practices for committing the funds of research projects,
introducing more formalized and bureaucratic procedures where project leaders were
previously able to directly (access the services of?) the administration clerks. The new
system became an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986) for the researchers
whenever they wanted access to the funds of their projects, but one that seriously
disrupted the working practices of CFNCA. Tension resulted when the researchers
demanded the system be changed. At the same time, the administrator did not want to
alter the processes embedded in the system because they were the conductors of the
necessary AHS control measures. This tension was the origin of the need for the
administrative assistants’ positions.
The administrative assistants become the buffers between the researchers and the
administration division of CFNCA, and this was the solution for integrating the system
into the work tasks of CFNCA. The assistants both ensured that the strict financial
controls remained in place and freed the researchers from administrative tasks so they
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could concentrate on their research projects. Although the system, in terms of software
and procedures, remained the same, it reached systemic integration because the
administrative assistants freed the researchers from all administrative tasks. In this
sense, the system was transformed when its intended main users changed. Thus,
systemic integration was achieved by the introduction of the administrative assistant
position since it allowed the main productive task of the organization, research, to
remain undisrupted.
Achieving systemic integration does not mean that the new information system leaves
the working practices of an organization unaltered. Our data shows how the system
instilled discipline in the administrative practices and enhanced control from AHS. The
net result was that, after the introduction of the administrative assistants, researchers
continued doing their research, and AHS ensured that the Center would have healthy
finances. However, it raised the costs of doing research because the Center had to pay
for the assistants. In addition, the presence of the assistants increased the bureaucracy
and size of the organization, and the researchers had to accept this situation as the
circuits of power of the Center favored the standing conditions of the administration.

The three circuits
Explaining the institutionalization of the system from the perspective of a single circuit
would had given us an incomplete account. If each circuit were a lens, when used
individually it would only reveal one dimension of power. However, the combination of
the three circuits provides an enhanced view, as happens when a collection of lens
filters are superimposed. The episodic circuit, by its emphasis on action and causal
power, would have provided an explanation based solely on events. Thus, we would
have learned about the conflict resulting from lack of user consultation and poor design.
Such conflict has already been documented in our field (Mumford, 1987; Davis, 1989).
Although illuminating, these theories do not tell us why, despite the lack of participation
and poor design, the system is accepted and later institutionalized. A likely explanation
is politics, but politics in this sense is regarded as the illegitimate side of power
(Mintzberg, 1983; Hirschheim and Klein, 1994) consequently it is black-boxed, with the
result of hindering our understanding of power.
Keen (1981) identified the need to unscrew the black box of politics in his classic paper
on organization and change. There he urged researchers in our field to conduct studies
to shed light on such a complex phenomenon:
Unfortunately, 'politics' have been equated with evil, corruption
and, worst of all, blasphemy in the presence of the Rational Ideal,
but politics are the process of getting commitment, or building
support, or creating momentum for change; they are inevitable...It
is absurd to ignore it...A political perspective on information
systems is needed in research. It will of necessity be based on
comparative field studies that illustrate theoretical concepts…It
can immensely add to our understanding both of the implications
of information technology and the dynamics of effective
implementation.p.31-32
By considering the other two circuits, we can complement the episodic account of power
and open the black box of politics. Thus, it was his close relationship with senior AHS
management (politics) that led the administrator’s view to eventually prevail. The circuit
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of social integration allowed us to identify the administrator’s sources of power: being
appointed by AHS and by enjoying the friendship and trust of senior management in the
headquarters. Moreover, the circuit of social integration allowed us to identify that one of
the roots of resistance and conflict was the meaning assigned by the researchers to
operating the system. They felt that operating the system undermined their status as
researchers. The circuit of social integration, then, helps to explain why one party
resisted and why the other prevailed.
Systemic integration was also key to complete the picture of power. It highlighted both
the failure of the system to deliver value to the main users, and its success for the
administrator in controlling CFNCA’s operations. Since the system was a vital instrument
for achieving the objectives of those in power, the disruption was corrected not by
modifying the essence of the system, but by adding more intermediaries to the system,
in this case the administrative assistants. Thus, the circuit of systemic integration
allowed us to explain why a disruptive system becomes institutionalized. In this case the
disruptions were compensated not by modifying the software, but by adding more staff.
In sum, we have analyzed each circuit and supported with evidence our argument that
for a system to be institutionalized it requires the integration of the three circuits of
power. Causal power is exercised by A when B is resisting. Institutionalization is
achieved when the system is no longer contested and it has become a routine in the
organization. We have argued that resistance will arise when the system is perceived as
a threat for the users or if it disrupts working practices; and will continue to be resisted
as long as it does not achieve social and systemic integration. We also have shown that
by looking at the three circuits of power we enrich our understanding of power relations
in the context of the institutionalization of an information system. In the next section we
discuss the implications of our research.

Implications
We will first discuss the theoretical implications of our research and put forward a set of
propositions derived from applying the framework to our case that are aimed at
theorizing about the process of institutionalization and its relation with power. Second,
we will articulate implications for practitioners and suggest some ways in which the
framework can be applied. The section concludes by discussing the limitations of our
research.

Theoretical Implications
The Circuits framework has been applied to the study of power and information systems
elsewhere (Introna 1997; Silva and Backhouse 1997), however, these works draw on
secondary data sources to study a system in a short period of time. Our research, on the
other hand, applies the framework for gathering and analyzing data in a longitudinal
study. Jasperson et. al. (2002) underline the benefit of longitudinal studies for research
on power since power relations and their effects require a longer span of time to be
identified. Our research is also different, as it applies the framework to an
institutionalization of a system rather than a failure.
Our main theoretical contribution is the adaptation of the Circuits framework so that it
can be applied by other researchers interested in studying power. Barnes (1990) notes
that one of Clegg’s limitations is that he does not make any link between theory and
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data, a limitation for researchers intending to apply the framework. In this paper, we
interpret and adopt each of the concepts from Clegg and we link them with the data
required for studying information systems and power (see Table 1 and Table 3). Given
the lack of studies in our field that integrate different views of power (Jasperson et. al.,
2002) this is a relevant contribution. As we have argued in the previous section, the
integrated view of power brings about the identification of its different elements that
otherwise would escape analysis. This approach makes it possible to propose a
concrete connection between the framework and data, and accordingly we have
formulated three theoretical propositions about power and institutionalization.
1st Proposition: The regulations and rules inscribed into an information system that has
been contested will favor the interests and goals of those who during the struggles held
the strongest standing conditions
The Circuits framework also calls our attention to apply a counterfactual proposition as a
means of analysis to learn about power relations in an organization. In other words, in
examining a system, we could say that the regulations and rules the system embodies
would not have been there without the exercise of power; especially if the system has
been previously contested. In our case, it was clear that the regulations and rules
automated by the system were directly dictated by AHS. Had the researchers been
effective in rejecting the system, we might argue that the system would have had
different regulations, favoring the managerial style of the researchers. Thus, an
implication of our research would be that practitioners and researchers can learn a great
deal about the power relations of an organization by looking at who “owns” the rules and
regulations of the system.
This proposition has been addressed by researchers of information systems, particularly
in the Scandinavian tradition. This tradition, and specifically the collective resource
approach, assumes that often the development of organizational information systems is
an arena in which two groups of stakeholders meet and in which the interest of one
group, that of management, prevails over the other group, workers (Bjerknes and
Bratteteig 1995). To paraphrase this relationship in episodic power terms, managers
(As) make workers (Bs) use a system that, given the chance, the workers would reject.9
Our research, then, is complementary to the observations made by Scandinavian
researchers – specifically with the collective resource approach – in the sense that
information systems reflect the power relations prevailing in the organization. As a
corollary, proposition one suggests that the Circuits framework can be used in the postimplementation phase to evaluate the power conditions in which the system was
developed. In our case, the information system represents the power relations between
administrators and researchers since it has inscribed the regulations and controls
specified by AHS.
This proposition is also related to the Socio-Technical approach to developing
information systems that focuses on job satisfaction. In discussing critical issues to
assure the integrity of information systems, Mumford (1983: 26), one of the main
exponents of this approach, suggests that the exercise of power can result in an
9

Given this situation Scandinavian researchers have argued in favor of a democratic approach to
develop information systems that reflects equally both parties’ interests (Bansler 1989; Livari and
Lyytinen 1998).
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information system having a one-sided influence. To eliminate power and its related
biases, Mumford advocates for users’ participation and for the presence of a facilitator.10
Although desirable, a power-free situation may be difficult to achieve given that, in
discussions and negotiations, different stakeholders bring to the table different identities
and opposing interests (Callon 1986). This shortcoming of the Socio-Technical approach
was previously pointed out by Hirschheim and Klein (1994: 85): “We believe the main
weakness of participation programs has been that they failed to take into account the
political background constraints that most clearly manifest themselves in the
institutional-legal context in which organizations operate.” The essence of proposition
one is to identify both the political background in which an information system is
conceived, developed and implemented and how this political background is reflected in
the system itself; hence the contribution of our proposed framework to the SocioTechnical approach.
2nd Proposition: In a contested system in a non-profit organization, contradictions
between working practices and the system will be resolved by adding bureaucracy
specifically if the rules inscribed on the system reflect the goals of those in powerful
positions
While the administrator was not keen on watering down the controls of the system, but
he acknowledged that it was getting in the way of the researchers, and alleviated their
workload by adding administrative assistants, or more bureaucracy. The implication of
more bureaucracy for resolving contradictions between working practices and the
system has to be qualified by the fact that our research was carried out in a non-profit
organization. In a for-profit organization, considerations about costs would probably
have been more significant in deciding whether or not to hire the administrative
assistants.
Our theoretical framework, and in particular this proposition, explains why systems that
are purposefully deployed by management to change working practices may result in
creating new positions and incurring unexpected costs. Our case illustrates how the
exercise of power and the unwillingness to change requirements had a price for the
organization.. Our theory explains this in terms of the system failing to achieve either
systemic or social integration. This we argue is what occurs with ERP systems, which
are deployed with the purpose of profoundly changing working practices. Research has
documented how their costs escalate, as their successful implementation needs the
addition of consultants and intensive training for existing personnel (Hitt, Wu et al. 2002).
However, it is worth distinguishing on ERP implementation from what occurred at
CFNCA. In the former, extra personnel and intensive training may signal poor systemic
integration, while in the latter the positions of new administrative personnel were critical
for the system to achieve institutionalization. This is an important distinction as extra
consulting and intensive training may not guarantee institutionalization of an ERP
implementation. Hence a corollary of this proposition suggests that the presence of
unplanned consultants and intensive training throughout a system implementation is
indicative of weak systemic integration, not a sign of future institutionalization.
10

Hirschheim and Klein (1994) observe the similarity of this condition regarding the absence of
power with the ideal speech situation proposed by Habermas (1972).
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3rd Proposition: The institutionalization of a system would be undermined if there were
disruptions or contradictions that would disturb the circuits of power:
As reported in the case, after the hiring of the administrative assistants the system still
experienced disruption. These were mainly technical and occurred when the system was
moved to the Windows NT platform. That was in 1998 and during that time the system
broke down with some frequency. However, the disruptions were neither so critical for
the system to be regarded as a threat to the identities and interests of the organization
nor so serious that its productivity was questioned. The circuits of power remained
integrated and the system remained institutionalized. This is not to say that the
institutionalization of a system lasts forever, as a serious disruption or a change in the
nature of CFNCA’s work could have brought about questioning of interests, identities
and productivity. In such a hypothetical situation, the circuits of power would have been
open to scrutiny and the institutionalization of the system would have been undermined.
It follows then that if managers (or others) would like to de-institutionalize a system, they
would have to disrupt the circuits of power.
The institutionalization of a system entails its routinization, and once this is achieved it
becomes taken for granted, and goes to the background of the organization (Kling and
Iacono, 1989). When breakdown occur, however, the system comes to the foreground
and is no longer taken for granted.11 If the interruptions are so frequent that they disrupt
the working practices of the organization, the systemic circuit of power will become
unstable, which will impact the circuit of social integration by altering the meanings
assigned to the system. A corollary of this proposition is that tolerance of failure will be a
function of power: the degree to which disruptions will be tolerated is inversely
proportional to the causal power of whoever is affected by the fault. In our case, when
the interruptions were affecting exclusively the administrative assistants, the tolerance
was greater than when the interruptions affected the researchers or the administrator.
Hence the framework can be applied as an analytical tool for studying the political
connotation of failures and faults since it provides an explanation of why there are
different levels of tolerance.
In considering the de-institutionalization of a system – that is what we suggest will
gradually occur if one of the circuits of power becomes unstable – we need to consider
not only the magnitude of the system but also the time that it has been institutionalized.
This is clearly explained and illustrated by Kling and Iacono (1989). These authors’ work
suggest that large and expensive systems in which organizations rely on core productive
practices and that have been in place for long time will be very difficult to deinstitutionalize. At the time Kling and Iacono (1989: 9) wrote their paper the Social
Security Administration (SSA still had an old autocoder system to produce 40 million
checks per month: "The SSA has tried to overhaul the payments system at least three
times in the last 15 years without success...the persistence of the SSA's outdated
payments system architecture from the 1950s indicates that large scale CBIS

11

This proposition is linked to what Winograd and Flores (1987) suggest occurs with information
systems and information technology. Although Winograd and Flores refer to IT as a tool and not
as an institution, we believe this is a valid comparison since what we are referring to here is the
systemic integration of the system; that is mainly how its technical dimension fits with the
organizational productive practices.
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[Computerized Based Information Systems] can be exceptionally difficult to replace."
Thus, disturbances in the circuits of power may indicate the beginning of a system’s deinstitutionalization, but by no means signal its imminent demise.

Implications for practitioners
The relationship that we have established between the institutionalization of an
information system and the circuits of power of an organization is a theoretical construct
that can enrich practitioners’ understanding of systems implementation.12 Specifically,
our contribution consists of articulating a theoretical framework to make sense of the
political issues involved in the institutionalization of a system from its conception to its
routinization. In addition, this paper illustrates the explanatory power of the framework by
providing an empirical account of how a system reaches institutionalization. Practitioners
can draw on the Circuits framework to determine the actions and resources, either
material or discursive, needed for a system to attain institutionalization. The strategic
view of power brought about by the Circuits framework becomes relevant when
managers are purposefully not looking for consensus, as in situations where they want
to bring about radical organizational changes.
Managers and information systems practitioners can use the Circuits framework to
assess and estimate the political feasibility of an information system project. In
formulating an implementation strategy, practitioners can use the framework to
incorporate a political component. They can use each of the circuits and its concepts as
a checklist before embarking on an information systems project. Each circuit should be
examined in detail (the questions outlined in Table 1 could be used as a starting point).
Any strategy for implementation should aim at achieving high levels of social and
systemic integration. Conversely, as hinted in the previous section, the circuits can also
be used as a guide when managers would like to de-institutionalize a system. They can
identify the circuits of power that sustain the system and then formulate strategies that
would undermine those circuits and consequently produce its de-institutionalization.
By looking at the concepts of the episodic circuit, practitioners may evaluate their
standing conditions and those of other stakeholders before engaging in a project,
enhancing the likelihood of having a successful implementation. In short, if the standing
conditions of the champions of the system are not favorable, the political feasibility of the
project may be questioned. It is important for practitioners to project clearly the desired
outcomes of the system’s stakeholders. Practitioners may use the interview guides and
concepts of Table 1 to elicit the goals of each party involved in the system. If
contradicting goals are identified, then careful attention to the other circuits of power is
required.
The concepts of the circuit of social integration draw attention to the rules of meaning
and membership. This will be particularly useful when looking at discourses of

12

Although not in the same exact terms, institutionalization has been previously discussed in the
implementation IS literature. For example, Cooper and Zmud (1990) consider institutionalization
as the routinization of an information system and Orlikowski (1992) refers to the
institutionalization of an information system as the incorporation of its associated repeated
practices into the structural properties of organizations. Kling and Iacono (1984) highlighted the
political impacts of an institutionalized information system as a factor for altering resource
allocation and status within an organization.
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legitimation related to the system. These discourses are fundamental for enrolling other
stakeholders whose support is deemed crucial to the success of the system (Callon
1986). Without legitimation, an information system would likely not receive support, and
therefore would not achieve institutionalization. Moreover, by drawing on the concepts of
social integration, practitioners may project the meanings a new system may have for its
prospective users. If the system has negative connotations for the users, managers and
analysts may take actions to either modify the system or work with the users so the
negative meanings are dissipated. Again, the concepts of Table 1 and the data
collection guide can help practitioners in their attempt to elicit the elements of the social
integration circuit.
The concept of systemic integration can also be of relevance for practitioners. The
successful implementation of a system requires considering the disciplinary techniques
that would accompany it. This is particularly relevant in contested systems, especially
where the system is weak in social integration. In our case, the administrator eliminated
alternative means of accessing funds and left the system as the only way to do so. This
was key for casting the system as an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986), since the
funds were fundamental for running research projects. We are not proposing that this
should be replicated; what we are suggesting is that practitioners need to think of ways
they can establish the systems as obligatory passage points for the users. In addition to
disciplinary techniques, systemic integration relates to how the system’s rules impinge
on working practices. By looking at this relationship, practitioners may reflect on the
effects of modifying current working practices to serve the purposes of whoever owns
the system. In our case, the information system was effective as an instrument for
instilling discipline.
Finally, the strategic nature of the circuits may somehow suggest a Machiavellian
approach to implementation. This is unavoidable given the intellectual thrust of the
framework, a strategic conception of power that emphasizes alliances and that actors in
an organization will have different interests and contradicting interpretations of the same
actions. This was demonstrated in the case by the administrator’s and researcher’s
different maneuvers, each pursuing different interests. In this sense, practitioners need
to reflect on the ethical consequences of using the framework. Professionals have the
obligation to act responsibly so they do not exploit people as a means to achieve goals.
This is an obligation for whoever is thinking about articulating a political strategy; a
challenge that practitioners must address when contrasting their political strategies and
objectives with the code of ethics of their profession. The Circuits framework is a
powerful instrument that requires ethical consideration and reflection.

Limitations
We found at least three limitations in our adaptation of the theoretical framework. One is
its complexity, manifested in the large amount of data that must be gathered in order to
depict the circuits of power of an organization. And this relates to the second and third
limitations. Second, while Clegg’s original framework includes an environmental
component, our adaptation of the framework does not account for the influences of the
power that come from the environment. We choose not include environmental factors to
avoid escalating the complexity of the framework, but we did incorporate the data into
our case so we could compose a coherent narrative.13 Specifically, we were able to
13

Clegg (1989) calls this factor exogenous contingencies. In the Appendix that contains our
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discover that the changes that brought about the new administrative system were
triggered by a financial crisis in CFNCA after an external audit. The incorporation of the
environmental factors into the framework could well be an area in which further research
can be conducted. This would extend the scope of the framework to the area of
interorganizational power.
The third limitation in our proposed framework concerns our interpretation of facilitative
power. In discussing the circuit of systemic integration, Clegg indicates that new
techniques of production -- besides any disciplinary qualities- -- will also empower and
disempower different organizational members. However, instead of focusing on this
duality, in this paper we emphasized the disciplinary aspects of facilitative power. The
main reasons for this were twofold. On the one hand, as mentioned above, we wanted to
keep the complexity of the framework manageable and, on the other hand, the analysis
of our data indicated that the most salient attribute of facilitative power shown by the
administrative information system was its disciplinary character. Nevertheless, we
believe that the empowering/disempowering feature of IS is a topic that researchers in
our field may be interested in exploring further. In addition to the limitations of the
adapted framework, our research approach brings about a couple of challenges worthy
of discussion.
There is a limitation in our discussion of episodic power. In analyzing the initial
resistance to the system, we observed that it would have been rejected because of its
poor design and lack of user involvement had it not been for the support of the
administration and AHS. We based this interpretation on our data and on established IS
research on participation and acceptance models (Mumford, 1987; Davis, 1989).
However, we are not implying that those are the only factors that would explain users’
resistance when analyzing the circuit of episodic power. In her classic paper about
power and politics, Markus (1983) observed that the rejection of a system cannot be
explained only in terms of poor design or attributed to particular characteristics of the
users.14 In our research, both the theoretical framework and the case study concur with
Markus’ theory, in the sense that a one-dimensional view of resistance does not fully
account for the complexity of power relations unleashed in the adoption of information
systems. Nevertheless, more detailed fieldwork is needed to identify other factors for
making sense of users’ resistance – we have only identified two – and the focus would
be on the episodic circuit.
Two of the strengths of interpretivist studies are that they allow an in-depth analysis of
stakeholders’ motivations and intentions and that they link context to organizational
processes (Walsham 1993 and 1995). In spite of this, findings of these studies cannot
be generalized to populations of organizations, and as such, our research cannot be
used to characterize any type of organization. Our results are circumscribed to the
adaptation of the theory, its testing, and the provision of analytical insights. As intimated
above, one of the limitations of the study is that the organization studied was a non-profit
one. This is a relevant consideration given that its nature permeates not only the
structure and governance of the organization but also its culture and values. These are
fundamental elements when studying power. In this sense we may speculate that in an
interview guides we incorporated questions regarding the exogenous factor; see under the
heading: “Exogenous Contingencies”.
14
As an alternative she proposed what she called a theory of interaction. This theory explains
resistance in terms of the interaction between the system and characteristics of the users.
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organization of different nature, users, managers and shareholders would not have been
that patient with the shortcomings of the system. Nevertheless, the study is still relevant
in learning about the concepts of the framework and the dynamics of non-profit
organizations.
Another limitation of our approach is that in order to conduct a study of this nature,
researchers are required to develop a strong rapport and trusted relationship with their
interviewees. There are ethical issues here that need careful attention. The researcher
should inform his interviewees about the purpose of the research, even though this may
inhibit their responses. Senior management may not consent to a study that asks
questions about the power relations of the organization. In this particular case, we were
very fortunate that the authorities of the organization agreed with the research once they
were ensured of anonymity. Another limitation of our study is the length of time required
to conduct the fieldwork. To study institutionalization it is necessary that the researchers
have a particular system under their observation for an extended period of time. For this
particular research we were privileged with permission to study the system for about six
years. That may be difficult to emulate in other circumstances.

Conclusion
In conclusion, as acknowledged early on by Keen (1981) and recently confirmed by
Jasperson et. al. (2002), the study of power is fundamental to understanding how
information systems are adopted and used in organizations. Its study is difficult not only
because of its elusiveness (Jasperson et. al. 2002: 398) but also because of its
connotation of evil and corruption (Keen 1981: 31). Hence, research on power presents
both a theoretical and an empirical challenge. This paper is a contribution in those two
senses. On the one hand, it provides a theoretical framework to analyze the different
dimensions of power, and on the other, offers an empirical study that details the process
of institutionalization of an information system from the point of view of power. However,
its main contribution consists in stimulating further research on this elusive and still not
fully understood phenomenon.
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APPENDIX
Interviews and data collection guide
The collection of data for this research has been guided by the six main elements of the
framework described above (outcomes, exogenous contingencies that introduce change
in the organization, episodic circuit, social integration circuit, system integration circuit
and obligatory passage points).
General Topic Guide
•

Research the history of the organization. Focus particularly on the way it usually has
adopted innovations such as information systems.

•

Interview people from different levels. This is fundamental. If there is no access to senior
management and employees, the analysis will lack depth. It would be relevant for the
study if one can interview people that no longer work in the organization as they are
outside the scope of action of powerful organizational agents.

•

Do not tape the interviews. People might hold back if they know they are being recorded,
especially if the conversation centers on the politics of the organization.

•

To allow the interviewees to expand their views it is important to use a semi-structured
type of interview. Ask them to tell a story regarding the information system. Ask for
examples: Would you tell me the how this information system was developed or
implemented? Emphasize those issues regarding power and information systems. At the
end ask the interviewee for a theorization about the facts. This is very important because
in this part the interviewees tell their own interpretation of the story.

•

Analyzing documents is also relevant. Particularly those regarding the information
systems, such as announcements or training documents. It is also important to identify
who attended launching or introductory meetings and to inquire about the reactions of the
participants.
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•

It is important to have a facilitator or sponsor within the organization who understands
and gets along well with the researcher, so he or she can help in identifying interviewees
or documents.

•

It will be relevant if the researcher can participate as an observer in meetings regarding
the information system. This allows the researcher to grasp the informal dimension of the
site.

•

It is important for the researcher to show a neutral position, particularly in conflict
situations. Interviewees should not perceive that the researcher is collecting information
to favor any of the parties in conflict.

INTERVIEWS AND DATA COLLECTION GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING
EXOGENOUS CONTINGENCIES
•

Look at the history of the organization and its mission.

•

Identify the position of the organization within its context (e.g. Is the organization among
the leaders of its industry?).

•

How has the organization adapted to previous information systems or innovations?

•

Describe how the institutionalization was carried out.

•

Was the institutionalization the result of coercive forces, such as legislation or
regulations?

•

Was the institutionalization the result of mimetic forces? Was the information system
adopted as a reaction to uncertainty or imitation because it was successful in other
existing organizations?

•

What variation in the environment of the organization brought about the introduction of
the information system?

•

What changes in the environment of the organization favored or impeded the introduction
of the information system?

Interviews and data collection guide for the circuit of social integration
The identification of this circuit is concerned with the norms, rules of meaning and
membership that prevail in groups within the organization. These norms and rules allow
the existence of agents' networks that are created through the process of sociological
translation (Callon 1986 and 1987; Latour 1987). To identify this circuit, the researcher
should ask questions such as: What is the relationship between the information system
and groups (in terms of their participation to sustain or to disrupt the information
system)? What are the norms that define those groups? What are the membership
rules? It also will be important to establish how these rules and norms are adopted and
sustained. In doing so, the researcher should look at the relationship between this circuit
and the environmental contingencies. This will allow the researcher to determine the
stability of the norms and the potential influence of the environment over the social
integration circuit. Issues to focus on include:
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•

Determine the formal and informal structure of the organization.

•

Identify possible points of strain between the information system and the institutional
order within the organization. Look for change in meanings; if there is contradiction then
tension will be unavoidable.

•

If the new system bring about new rules and meanings these may threaten the
established order. This is important because it shows that the introduction of information
systems, if successful, can transform the current order.
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•

Has there been any recent change in the group norms or meanings? What was the
cause of this change?

•

How was the adoption of the information system interpreted? Who set the interpretation
rules?

Interviews and data collection guide for the circuit of system integration
The researcher should identify here the technological and material conditions prevailing
in the organization. This will imply establishing the techniques and knowledge required
to produce the outcomes and the mechanisms of control and discipline exerted over the
physical and social context of the organization. The researcher should ask questions
such as:
•

How are the members (groups and individuals) of the organization achieving their goals?

•

What are the material resources, techniques and skills that organizational members
require to perform their tasks?

•

What are the mechanisms of control and discipline exerted over the organizational
members when they perform their activities?

•

Why are particular innovations adopted?

•

Who are the organizations or institutions that are influencing the adoption of the new
technology?

•

Who benefits? Answering these questions will allow the researcher to identify how the
environment influences organizations. Thus, the researcher could anticipate what changes in
the environment might have an impact on the system integration circuit and therefore on the
organization.

•

Describe the role of the information system in the exercise of power (control or
surveillance or as an automation tool, i.e. technology for increasing production).

•

What other resources were deployed along with the information system to achieve the
outcome?: Threats, discourses (words), training, money, and other means of control,
new rules (either explicit or implicit).

•

Are all agents in the organization subject to the same regime of discipline and control?
Resistance might arise from those not subject to the same regime.

Interviews and data collection guide for the episodic circuit of power and
obligatory passage points
To identify the circuit of episodic power, the researcher should concentrate on the
struggles to establish or maintain control over resources. Once the information system
under study has been identified, the researcher should answer questions such as: What
are the outcomes people intend by executing actions? Who are performing those
actions? Which resources do they need? Which alliances allow control over resources?
Who are resisting them?
Issues to focus on:
•

Identify power actors (the best way of doing this at the beginning is by asking
interviewees who they consider to be powerful)

•

How did other agents react? Did they oppose resistance? Describe the resistance
presented by other agents.

•

How was the resistance outflanked, circumvented or counterpoised?

•

Was the result of the resistance successful?
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•

Ask other agents how they interpreted the objectives of the information systems?

•

Identify which groups wanted to exert power over others, who would oppose resistance
to keep control over their resources and those who are being disempowered or
empowered by the introduction of the information system. Those losing discretionality will
resist and those with more discretionality will perceive that they have been empowered.

•

It is important also to identify those who will be subjects of control by the introduction of
the information system. Those perceiving themselves as the subject of control might
resist.

•

Did agents succeed in controlling resources and achieving their outcomes? Describe
how they achieve this control. How did agents defeat (outflank) resistance?

•

Did subordinates have any chance to resist? Did they know how to resist? Did they have
resources to offer resistance?

•

What other agents came into play because of the introduction of the information system?

•

What new alliances were required for the institutionalization of the information system?

•

What was the result of the information system? Did those proposing it achieve their
intended outcomes?

•

Ask managers about their intentions in introducing the information system.

•

Ask managers whether they believe that they have achieved their intended outcomes.

•

Identify the resources (material and symbolic) required by agents to achieve their desired
outcomes.

•

Examine how the information system was introduced, particularly the explanations,
negotiations or maneuvers that accompanied the adoption and institutionalization of the
innovation.

•

Were other agents convinced by explanations, or forced by agents owning the
information system?

•

How were the explanations for the information system and its rationale for adoption
presented?

•

By drawing on the sociology of translation identify and describe how the information
system was institutionalized.

•

Into which terms did agents translate the information system?
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